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attacks cannot be allowed to continue, and the United States already has a number of policies
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Introduction
Technology has revolutionized the nature of information, remote control, and communication itself, but it has
also brought with it tangible dangers. Top minds in the United States, as well as the rest of the world, have seen
those dangers and dedicated their work to mitigate them, developing the ideas and policies necessary to protect
the nation from those dangers, and yet the actual implementation of safety measures within the nation lags
behind.
In the meantime, as U.S. critical infrastructure remains woefully unprotected, the nation opens itself up to a
plethora of cyber-attacks. These attacks can cause damage in many ways. There are the obvious, tangible effects
like costing trillions of dollars [1], poisoning water supplies to cause illness [2], or causing power outages [3], but
we must also consider more subtle, social damages caused as well, such as losing trust, questioning the legitimacy
of polling machines, or losing a sense of security in general. Regardless of the damage caused, it is clear that these
and strategies in place to defend itself and its critical infrastructure. However, despite
being theoretically applicable and effective, the nation routinely sees them go
unimplemented even as preventable attacks repeatedly succeed.
What is it about the current U.S. policy that leaves it so vulnerable, and 
how can it be remedied? This brief addresses the question and offers
a recommendation. 
Current Policy
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
The first piece of active policy highlighted is the newly formed
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Created
in 2018, it works to secure the nation’s critical infrastructure from
cybersecurity threats by researching solutions to possible threats,
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offering penetration testing to identify existing 
vulnerabilities and issuing cybersecurity directives [4]. 
Having a singular agency in charge of securing the 
United States’ critical infrastructure streamlines the 
process of creating new security measures, 
implementing those measures, and responding to 
active threats when compared to giving the task to 
the Department of Homeland Security or the Central 
Intelligence Agency, both of which must also manage 
other responsibilities as well [5]. CISA’s existence was 
proven to be a great benefit to the nation's 
cybersecurity in its first two years, but CISA could be 
doing much more than it is currently. 
Process 1: Air Gapping 
Air gapping is a process when a network of 
computers is completely disconnected from all other 
networks. Without outside network connections, it 
becomes impossible to hack a computer remotely, 
which is how the vast majority of cyberattacks are 
conducted. A cyberattack, especially one from 
another nation, becomes significantly more difficult 
to conduct if the attacker must be physically present 
in the facility. It is a functionally simple solution to 
what appears to be a complex problem. 
There are numerous other individual policies equally 
varied in efficacy, application, and complexity; these 
just demonstrate the width of the scale 
Process 2: Cybersecurity Engineering (CSE) 
The second process is called Cybersecurity 
Engineering (CSE) and seeks to form a top-to-bottom 
security seal on an entire system, including all its 
component parts, from manufacturing and coding to 
operation. It is a more rigorous process that would 
require the government to have access to every level 
of production used in creating the infrastructure 
used in the sector, but the CSE philosophy creates 
functionally impenetrable systems. It can also be 
implemented more modularly as needed, securing 
specific, vulnerable components instead of entire 
systems, though with the modularity the 
completeness of the seal would be lost. All in all, it is 
a relatively high complexity solution that potentially 
offers more complete security in all situations. 
Risks and Benefits 
There are significantly more benefits than risks 
when it comes to employing cybersecurity systems. 
The majority of concerns lie in ethical considerations, 
over-reliance of the integrity of systems, and access 
to vital information. National cybersecurity has 
access to invaluable amounts of private data and 
business information that has been entrusted to it, a 
sacrifice that individuals make which comes with 
trusting that those people who are in charge of 
protecting data do not abuse their power. 
Additionally, failures in cybersecurity may go 
unnoticed for months or years, leading to massive 
loss of money and data while the security failure 
remains on other systems [6]. 
Sacrifices that exist are ultimately necessary ones 
compared to alternative of remaining undefended 
Cybersecurity protects both the private and public 
sectors from threats intended to obtain vital 
information, disrupt communications, and destroy 
infrastructure. Governmental cyberattacks are being 
thwarted by the emergence of improved engineering 
techniques that employ secure devices, trusted 
suppliers and code with limited flaws. Public 
information and infrastructure are becoming more 
secure as prime targets, such as water purification 
systems and business revenues, are taking a priority 
in national defense [2]. As time goes on, systems are 
becoming increasingly secure at a rate that threatens 
cyber attackers, but there will always be more risks 
to cover and methods that bad actors will use to 
access various parts of a system. The ever-vigilant 
design of systems must allow for future changes and 
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lifetime of the system. These systems save the 
country hundreds of millions of dollars every year, 
but failures still lead to massive losses that still need 
to be mitigated [1]. 
Ethical Considerations and 
Counterattacks 
In an ethical review of cybersecurity, the authors 
considered a number of approaches to ethics, as 
ethicality is by no means a singular and obvious 
thing. For this, we consider the following three 
common approaches to determining ethicality: 
consequentialist ethics, non-consequentialist ethics, 
and agent-centered ethics [7]. Regardless of which of 
those approaches we choose to take, protecting 
food, energy, healthcare, and water (examples of 
critical infrastructure sectors according to CISA) [8], 
with any purely defensive policy would certainly be 
heralded highly by all approaches alike. Those 
sectors, in particular, are generally considered 
necessities or near necessities, and protecting them 
with no intent to harm the attacker would mean 
there is little to argue with. Other sectors with more 
questionable things to protect, while probably still 
supererogatory in the end for most, have much more 
to contend with as the thing being protected is itself 
ethically questionable, which makes the ethics of 
defending it more questionable. 
The ethicality of certain options can be unclear 
when organizations start considering whether 
offensive measures need to be put in place, such as 
a counterattack. A counterattack is when an 
organization's systems are taken down by hacking 
them. This may be deemed necessary if an 
organization is under constant attack, so unless they 
take down the root cause of the attacks, the 
organization will be in constant danger. However, if 
it is possible to make the nation’s critical 
infrastructure impregnable, then we need not worry 
about the ethics of a counterattack since there will 
never be any damage to use as justification to 
counterattack with. We thus conclude that 
cybersecurity as a whole should be considered as 
ethically sound, if not mandatory, depending on the 
philosophy to which one subscribes. 
Any ethical sacrifices that may exist are ultimately 
outweighed 
Costs 
The obligatory nature of cybersecurity would 
mean that most costs are acceptable, so long as two 
things hold: (1) that the cost of security is less than 
the cost of damages and (2) that the cost is not so 
exorbitant that it detracts from the ability to provide 
obligatory services elsewhere. The costs can be put 
into three categories: monetary, privacy, and 
convenience. Monetarily speaking, Information 
Technology specialists predict cybersecurity funding 
will surpass $1 trillion over the next five years. 
However, projections for damage by cyberattacks 
are expected to be $6 trillion for 2021 with the 
average cost of a data breach of $3.86 million and 
taking 191 days to identify breaches [1]. 
Expensive, but less expensive than being attacked 
Another cybersecurity cost is the loss of privacy 
and anonymity of people when they are online. 
While giving up a little bit of privacy for a large 
increase in security seems like a good deal, many 
people believe that government increasing online 
security could be problematic and fear that their 
privacy rights will be affected by people “watching” 
what they do on the internet. Another frequently 
acknowledged cost to cybersecurity is the social cost 
of convenience. Similar to the tradeoff between 
security and privacy, there is a tradeoff between 
security and convenience regardless of if that 
security is cyber or otherwise. The more secure 
something is, the more troublesome it becomes to 
operate it normally. The exact cost of widespread 
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since it depends heavily on what policies get 
implemented where; in general, however, it is clear 
that the cost of an attack will far outweigh the cost 
of security. 
Policy Recommendation 
CISA needs to step forward and begin actively and 
forcefully managing the nation’s cybersecurity. CISA 
already operates with the mission to mitigate risk to 
the nation’s critical infrastructure, and the change in 
role would not require a very large change in terms 
of the powers it has been granted, as they are 
already capable of issuing mandates [9]. In essence, 
the United States government would have CISA 
execute the tasks it has done since its creation in 
2018, but simply act more forcefully, requiring that 
all critical infrastructure be made secure instead of 
simply aiding those who want it. We are tempted to 
prescribe specific policies to specific sectors with 
specific timeframes, but such an approach lacks a 
certain nuance that must exist in the implementation 
of cybersecurity nationwide. 
CISA appears to be in the prime position to take the 
lead in providing immediate, short-term solutions to 
stop existing defensive failures while having the 
expertise to manage the future of cybersecurity. 
Conclusion 
The problem the nation’s cybersecurity faces is not 
a lack of ideas, it is a lack of urgency. The United 
States has in place organizations like CISA to manage 
the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure sectors as 
well numerous ways to create security through 
techniques, such as air gapping and CSE. When 
installed properly, these measures can be cost 
effective as well as functional, and yet they remain 
unimplemented. As individuals, we lack the ability to 
influence change ourselves, so we must rely on—and 
advocate for—CISA to step forward and forcibly 
effect those changes in our stead. As a collective, we 
can provide the impetus that the urgent changes the 
United States’ cybersecurity situation deserves. 
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